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1. Introduction
This note is an attempt to provide an overview of and critically analyse the
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR or ‘Court’) most recent case law on
the responsibility of member states of international and supranational organ-
isations. The focus will be on the Court’s application of its Bosphorus decision
in later cases and how it distinguished the Bosphorus case law from the more
recent Behrami decision.
The Bosphorus case was concerned with the impounding of an aircraft by
Ireland on the basis of an obligation in a European Communities (EC) regula-
tion, which itself was based on a Resolution by the United Nations (UN)
Security Council.1 Because the aircraft was impounded by Irish authorities on
Irish territory, the ECtHR had no difficulty finding that the applicant company
was within Ireland’s jurisdiction according to Article1 of the European
* DAAD/Clifford Chance lecturer at the Faculty of Laws, University College London (t.lock@ucl
.ac.uk). I would like to thank the editors for their helpful comments and Jennifer
Hegarty-Owens for proofreading this article.
1 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim S iketi v Ireland 2005-VI; 42 EHRR 1
(Bosphorus).
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or ‘Convention’) so that Ireland could be
held responsible for impounding the aircraft and any violation of the ECHR
that arose therefrom. The ECtHR then famously held that the Contracting
Parties to the ECHR are not prohibited from transferring sovereign power to
an international organisation but that they remain responsible for all acts
and omissions of their organs ‘regardless whether the act or omission was a
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international
legal obligations’.2 The Court went on to state that as long as the international
organisation ‘is considered to protect fundamental rights. . . in a manner
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention
provides’ the Court will presume that a State has acted in compliance with
the Convention, where the state had no discretion in implementing the legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation.3 That presump-
tion can, however, be rebutted where the protection in the particular case is re-
garded as ‘manifestly deficient’.4 The Court thus introduced a two-stage test:
at the first stage the Court examines whether an organisation provides an
equivalent protection, which causes the presumption to apply. At the second
stage the Court examines whether that presumption has been rebutted in the
concrete case before it because of a manifest deficit in the protection of
human rights. In the Bosphorus case, the ECtHR considered the human rights
protection afforded by the European Union to be equivalent to that of the
Convention, so the presumption applied. The Court saw no reason why the pro-
tection in that case could be considered manifestly deficient.5 Therefore, the
ECtHR held that the interference with the applicant’s property rights protected
byArticle1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR was justified.
In Bosphorus, the Court offered an important clarification to its earlier
ruling in Matthews v United Kingdom.6 Matthews was the first case in which
the Court held that a Member State of the European Union was in breach of
the Convention brought about by EU law. The violation was rooted in the EC
Act on Direct Elections of 1976, a treaty concluded by all the EU Member
States at the time. The Court in Matthews expressly stated:
The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to interna-
tional organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be
‘secured’. Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after
such a transfer.7
2 Ibid. at para. 153.
3 Ibid. at paras 155 and 156.
4 Ibid. at para. 156.
5 Ibid. at paras 159^66.
6 1999-I; 28 EHRR 361.
7 Ibid. at para. 32.
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In contrast to Matthews, the violation in Bosphorus could not be directly found
in EU primary legislation, i.e. the treaties, but in secondary legislation, i.e. an
act adopted by the organisation itself.8 The main difference with regard to the
protection of human rights is that acts of secondary legislation can be chal-
lenged before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).While Matthews established
that the Member States of the EU remain generally accountable for human
rights violations caused by the law of the European Union, the Bosphorus deci-
sion was seen as an attempt to accommodate the autonomy of the EU legal
order within the premise set out in Matthews.9 Furthermore, it was submitted
that the judgment had to be viewed in the specific context of an EU accession
to the Convention10 and of the potentially overlapping jurisdiction between
the ECtHR and the ECJ.11
The Bosphorus decision left a number of questions unanswered, some of
which this note will attempt to answer in light of the latest case law in which
Bosphorus was either applied or distinguished. The first open point was
whether the Bosphorus presumption would also apply where there was no
action or omission by a Member State but only action by EU institutions.12 It
was also unclear when exactly the protection granted by an international or-
ganisation would be considered ‘manifestly deficient’ and how rigorous the
ECtHR’s scrutiny would be. Would the presumption also apply where the na-
tional court dealing with the case did not make a preliminary reference to the
ECJ under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU; former Article 234 of the Treaty of the European Community)?13 A fur-
ther point was how much (if any) discretion in implementing its legal obliga-
tions flowing from its membership in an international organisation a Member
State of the EU can enjoy before the presumption will cease to apply.14
2. The Requirement of a Domestic Act
A. The Decisions
After Bosphorus it seemed that under the Convention a Member State of an
international organisation was generally responsible for acts and omissions
8 Ibid. at para. 157.
9 Costello, ‘The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights
and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’, (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 87 at 88.
10 Ibid. at 89.
11 Ibid. at 119.
12 It was suggested that the presumption should apply in such a case as well, see Winkler,
‘Die Vermutung ‘‘a« quivalenten’’ Grundrechtsschutzes im Gemeinschaftsrecht nach dem
Bosphorus-Urteil des EGMR’, [2007] Europa« ische Grundrechtezeitschrift 641 at 653^4.
13 Peers, ‘Bosphorus European Court of Human Rights’, (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law
Review 443 at 452.
14 Ibid. at 453.
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required of that organisation and could only escape that responsibility where
the presumption applied and was not rebutted. However, in the case of
Behrami, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR introduced an important distinc-
tion.15 The case concerned the responsibility of certain Member States of the
Council of Europe for the action of their troops that formed part of the security
presence in Kosovo (KFOR), which had been established by a resolution of the
UN Security Council.16 Could acts and omissions by these troops still be attrib-
uted to the Convention Parties under Article 1 of the ECHR? That provision re-
quires that the applicants were ‘within [the State’s] jurisdiction’. The ECtHR
held that the acts and omissions of these troops were attributable to the
United Nations, not the Contracting Party concerned, because the Security
Council retained ultimate control over them.17 The Court went on to distin-
guish the case from the Bosphorus case. There the measure had been carried
out by the respondent State (Ireland) on its territory, so the Court did not con-
sider that its jurisdiction ratione personae was an issue, even though the
source of the respondent State’s action was an EU regulation.18 In the case of
Behrami, however, the Court held that the actions and omissions could not be
attributed to the respondent States. They did not take place on their territory
or by virtue of a decision of their authorities.19 The Court also pointed to the
‘fundamental distinction’ between the EU and the UN and accorded great sig-
nificance to the latter organisation’s universal jurisdiction, which was ‘fulfilling
its imperative collective security objective’.20
In Beric v Bosnia and Herzegovina,21 the fourth section of the Court applied
the approach taken in Behrami. The facts of both cases were very similar. The
applicants had been removed from their public offices in the administration of
the respondent State by the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the holder of a position established by the Dayton Peace Agreement22 and
appointed by a UN Security Council Resolution.23 The Court concluded that
the High Representative’s actions were attributable to the UN and not to the
respondent State. As in Behrami, the Court explicitly contrasted the case with
the Bosphorus decision. However, this time it did not rely on the fact that the
15 Behrami and Behrami v France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway 45 EHRR SE10.
16 UNSC Res. 1244, 10 June 1999, S/RES/1244.
17 Behrami, supra n. 15 at paras 132^41. This finding was heavily criticised by commentators,
mainly because the question of whether an act or omission is attributable to the UN does
not determine whether it is (also) attributable to the member state; cf. Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and
International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’,
(2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 151 at 159; and ‘Case Comment on Behrami and Saramati’
(2007) European Human Rights Law Review 698 at 702.
18 Behrami, supra n. 15 at para. 151.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 46 EHRR SE6.
22 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1995/999; Annex 10
of the Agreement sets out the mandate of the High Representative.
23 UNSC Res. 1031, 15 December 1995, S/RES/1031 (1995).
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measures in Beric were not carried out within the territory of a Contracting
Party (because they were) but rather that the measures complained of did not
require any implementation by the domestic authorities.24 Referring to its rea-
soning in Behrami, the Court declared the case inadmissible ratione personae.
The Court has extended its approach in Behrami beyond cases involving the
UN, to labour disputes between international organisations and their employ-
ees. In Boivin v 34 Member States of the Council of Europe,25 an employee of
the international organisation Eurocontrol, of which the 34 respondent States
were members, complained of his removal from the post of head accountant
at the organisation’s Institute of Air Navigation Services. Having been unsuc-
cessful with an internal complaint, the applicant brought a case to the compe-
tent International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal, where he
also was unsuccessful. The ECtHR distinguished the case from Bosphorus be-
cause ‘[a]t no time did [the respondent states] intervene directly or indirectly
in the dispute, and no act or omission of those States or their authorities can
be considered to engage their responsibility under the Convention’.26 It held
that the applicant’s complaints were directed against the decision of the
Administrative Tribunal and not against a measure by the respondent States.
As there was no involvement of the respondent States in the functioning of
the Administrative Tribunal, the Court applied the reasoning of Behrami and
held the case to be inadmissible ratione personae as the actions could not be
attributed to the respondent States.
Essentially the same reasoning was applied in the case of Connolly v 34
Member States of the Council of Europe, which dealt with a labour dispute
between an employee of the European Commission and the EC.27 The applicant
took his complaint to the Court of First Instance and to the ECJwhere his request
to submit written observations on the opinion of the Advocate General was
denied. He then took a case against all the (then) Member States to Strasbourg
claiming a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR. As in Boivin, the Court stated that
in reality the complaint was directed against the decisions by the EU courts
and that at no time did the respondent States directly or indirectly intervene.
Thus the Court declared the complaint inadmissible ratione personae.
The same substantive question was raised only a few weeks later in
Kokkelvisserij v The Netherlands.28 The applicant had been granted a licence
for cockle fishing in the North Sea by the Dutch authorities. This licence was
24 Supra n. 21 at para. 29.
25 Application No. 73250/01, Admissibility Decision of 9 September 2008.
26 Ibid.
27 Application No. 73274/01, Admissibility Decision of 9 December 2008; confirmed in Beygo v
46 Member States of the Council of Europe, Application No 36099/06, Admissibility Decision
of 16 June 2009; and Rambus Inc. v Germany, Application No 40382/04, Admissibility
Decision of 16 June 2009.
28 48 EHRR SE18.
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objected to by a Dutch environmental organisation, which led to domestic pro-
ceedings in the Dutch administrative court. The applicant appeared as an
interested party in these proceedings. Because the interpretation of the
European Community’s Habitat Directive29 was at issue, the Dutch court
made a reference under Article 234 of the EC Treaty (now Article 267 TFEU)
to the ECJ. As in Connolly, the applicant requested permission to submit a writ-
ten response to the Advocate General’s opinion in the case. That request was
denied by the ECJ30 and the applicant took the case to the ECtHR. In contrast
to Connolly, the ECtHR held that the denial could be imputed to the
Netherlands. It expressly distinguished the case from Boivin as the applicant’s
complaint in Kokkelvisserij was based on an ‘intervention by the ECJ actively
sought by a domestic court in proceedings pending before it. It cannot there-
fore be found that the respondent party is in no way involved’.31 The Court
then quoted and applied the Bosphorus case and held that the presumption
could not be rebutted because the protection of Convention rights was not
manifestly deficient.32
On the same day as Connolly, the same section of the ECtHR decided the
case of Biret v 15 Member States of the European Union.33 Biret was an importer
of beef from the USA to the European Union. In 1988 the European Union
adopted two directives prohibiting certain hormones in beef, which led to an
embargo against the importation of US beef. Because of the embargo, the appli-
cant company became insolvent in 1995. In 1998, the Appellate Body of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) held that the embargo against US beef was
incompatible withWTO law. On that basis, the applicant company tried to re-
cover damages from the European Community, but failed.34 Biret made two
distinct complaints to the ECtHR. It claimed a violation of its procedural
rights enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR because it did not have a
chance to directly challenge the EC directives in the Community courts. The
company claimed that its property rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 had been infringed because the measures had deprived the company of
its business. The Biret decision is instructive as it confirms both the approaches
taken in Behrami and Bosphorus. With regard to the claims based on Biret’s
procedural rights under Articles 6 and 13, the Court held that they related
solely to deficits in the judicial protection offered by the EC and were thus not
attributable to the Member States.35 When discussing the alleged infringement
29 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of
wild fauna and flora, [1992] OJ L 206/7.
30 ECJ, Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging andVogelsbeschermingvereniging [2004] ECR I-7405.
31 Kokkelvisserij, supra n. 28 at para. 3.
32 It is noteworthy that the Court’s decision neither refers to Connolly nor to Biret.
33 Application No. 13762/04, Admissibility Decision of 9 December 2008.
34 ECJ, Case C-93/02 P Biret International v Council [2003] ECR I-10497.
35 Biret, supra n. 33 at para. 1.
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of Biret’s property rights, the Court held that France could generally be held re-
sponsible as Biret was affected by measures implementing the embargo taken
by France. The Court then applied its Bosphorus presumption in favour of the
Community legal order and stated that it could not find a manifestly deficient
protection of human rights in the present case. Therefore the application was
held to be manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible.
The cases discussed above suggest that the Court has applied the following
distinctions. The Bosphorus principle applies where a Contracting Party’s
authorities have acted, either by implementing a decision of an international
organisation (Bosphorus) or by making a reference to that organisation’s court
(Kokkelvisserij). In the former case, applications are held inadmissible ratione
personae as they are directed, in effect, against an act of an international or-
ganisation, which is not a party to the Convention. In accordance with the
Behrami case law, the Court finds that the applicant was not within the juris-
diction of the respondent State.
In the latter type of case the Bosphorus presumption applies. The Court must
examine whether that presumption has been rebutted which requires a
manifest deficiency in the human rights protection in the actual case.Where
the presumption is not rebutted, the Court will declare the case inadmissible
because it is manifestly ill-founded.
However, in the most recent decision of Gasparini v Italy and Belgium,36
the second section of the Court offered a further distinction. The subject of
the case was another labour dispute, this time between the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and an employee, Gasparini, regarding an
increase in NATO’s pension levy. The applicant filed a complaint with the
NATO Appeals Board (NAB). As the NAB’s sessions are not held in public,
the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR. In that case, the
Court offered a new reading of the Boivin, Connolly and Kokkelvisserij
cases. As Gasparini concerned a labour dispute, one would have expected
the Court to declare the application inadmissible ratione personae. However, it
distinguished the cases of Boivin and Connolly from the case of Gasparini.
While in the earlier cases the complaints were directed against a particular
decision of an organ of an organisation, in Gasparini the complaint
was directed against a structural deficit in the internal mechanism for con-
flict resolution. Thus the Court went on to examine whether there was a
manifest deficit in the protection of fundamental rights, which it could not
detect.
36 Application No. 10750/03, Admissibility Decision of 12 May 2009.
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B. Comment
After Bosphorus, it was speculated that the Court would apply the Bosphorus
presumption a fortiori where it would have to decide a case in which there
was no implementing action by a Member State. In Connolly, however, the
Court decided to go even further and made it clear that it will not consider
cases where there was no action by a Contracting Party. Domestic action can
either consist of an implementing act, as was the case in Bosphorus, or a pre-
liminary reference by a domestic court to the ECJ, as was the case in
Kokkelvisserij. In such cases the Court will generally hold the respondent State
responsible and apply the Bosphorus principle. In cases where only the interna-
tional organisation acted (and none of the Contracting Parties), the Court will
apply the Behrami approach, unless the complaint is directed against a ‘struc-
tural deficit in the internal mechanism for conflict resolution’.37 This warrants
some comment.
It is remarkable that the Court extended the Behrami approach beyond cases
where the act or omission by the respondent States’ officials was attributable
to the United Nations. In both Behrami and Beric, the Court emphasised that
the actions or omissions complained of happened in the context of a UN
Security Council Resolution. When distinguishing the Bosphorus case, the
Court stressed that the great majority of Contracting Parties had joined the
UN before becoming a party to the Convention.38 Moreover, the Court specific-
ally mentioned Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides that the obliga-
tions originating in the Charter, including the obligations flowing from
Security Council Resolutions, prevail over other international legal obliga-
tions.39 And finally, the Court stated:
Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter are fundamental to the mission of the UN to secure inter-
national peace and security and since they rely for their effectiveness on
support from member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a
manner which would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting
Parties which are covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in
the course of such missions, to the scrutiny of the Court.40
This statement makes it clear that the solution found in Behrami was tailored
to the specific context of a conflict between Contracting Parties’ obligations
under the Convention and under the law of the United Nations, which, accord-
ing to Article 103 of the UN Charter, is supreme. The Court expressly relied on
37 ‘[U]ne lacune structurelle du me¤ canisme interne concerne¤ ’, ibid.
38 Behrami, supra n. 15 at para. 147.
39 Ibid. at para. 148.
40 Ibid. at para. 149.
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this passage in Beric.41 Furthermore, all Member States of the European Union
are bound by the ECHR, which is not the case for all members of the United
Nations. Thus, there is nothing in Behrami to suggest that the solution found
in that case should be extended to obligations flowing from the Contracting
Parties’ membership in other organisations. This seems to have also been the
position of the Court as it explicitly pointed out the difference between the
EU, to which Bosphorus applied, and the UN, which acted as an organisation
of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective.42
Moreover, it is submitted that the extension is against the very spirit of the
Court’s judgments in Matthews and Bosphorus. In those cases, the Court made
it clear, that Contracting Parties cannot escape their responsibility under the
Convention by transferring sovereign rights to international organisations.
They remain responsible for violations of Convention rights originating in the
organisation’s constituent treaties (Matthews) and violations of Convention
rights originating in acts or omissions by the organs of the organisation
(Bosphorus). This pro-human rights approach avoided a circumvention of
Convention obligations by Contracting Parties. Even if the States allowed an
international organisation to exercise sovereign rights in their place, they
would be held responsible under the Convention for any violation arising
therefrom. Where State action is undertaken by international organisations,
this should not be immune from the supervision of the Court.43 The novel ap-
plication of the Behrami approach beyond the context of the United Nations
makes exactly such circumvention possible. In this respect, the Court’s state-
ment that the application in Connolly was essentially directed against the deci-
sion of the Administrative Tribunal is hardly convincing. The same argument
could have been made in Bosphorus where the application was in reality dir-
ected against the EU regulation or even the resolution of the UN Security
Council on which the regulation was based.44
Of course, it can be argued that purely internal disputes, such as labour dis-
putes between international organisations and their employees, do not involve
an exercise of sovereign powers by the organisation and thus should not be
subject to review by the ECtHR. However, I suggest that the approach taken
in older cases involving labour disputes between an international organisation
and their employees provides a preferable solution. In the cases of Beer and
Regan v Germany45 andWaite and Kennedy v Germany,46 the Court found that
41 Supra n. 21 at para. 29.
42 Behrami, supra n. 15 at para. 151.
43 This was pointed out by Judge Ress in his concurring opinion to the Bosphorus case, supra n.
1 at para. 1.
44 Peers, supra n.13 at 453, rightly pointed out that even the distinction between Bosphorus and
Matthews is not that easy.
45 33 EHRR 54.
46 1999-I; 30 EHRR 261.
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the respondent State was justified in granting immunity from suit to the
European Space Agency because that agency offered a reasonable alternative
to protect its employees’ rights, namely its own independent appeals proced-
ure.47 By carrying out a substantive test, this approach clearly avoided any po-
tential violation of the rights of the employees. In Connolly, the Court
distinguished the cases just mentioned arguing that the applicants in the
former cases brought their case before a domestic court and not before an in-
ternal mechanism for conflict resolution as in Connolly.48 Thus the Court
relied on the absence of a domestic act, which, for the reasons mentioned
above, cannot justify a differentiation in the human rights protection guaran-
teed by the Convention. One may wonder whether the Court would have fol-
lowed the same route had the issue in the case not been the much-debated
question of the right to respond to the Advocate General’s opinion,49 but a
clear violation of Convention rights, for instance a complete denial of judicial
review.
The Gasparini judgment is significant for several reasons. First, it extends
the Bosphorus presumption to an organisation beyond the EU. Second, the deci-
sion can be regarded as an attempt to mitigate the effects of the Court’s previ-
ous decisions. It offers a very restrictive reading of the Connolly and Boivin
cases in that it distinguishes between actual decisions by the organisation
and deficiencies in the protection of fundamental rights, rooted in a structural
deficit of the internal mechanism for conflict resolution. Surprisingly, the
Court then applied the Bosphorus principle, which in the EU context is only
relevant in the case of secondary EU law. The main reason why the Bosphorus
presumption does not apply to violations originating in the treaty itself is that
there is no judicial remedy against them under EC law. The ECJ only has juris-
diction to declare acts of secondary EU law to be incompatible with the EU’s
founding treaties and fundamental rights recognised in the EU’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights or as general principles of EU law. Considering that there
is no possibility to challenge the Staff Rules of NATO within NATO, the Court
ought to have applied the Matthews doctrine whereby it has full jurisdiction
to review whether the rule complained of is in violation of the Convention.
Third, the Gasparini judgment seems to introduce a new rationale for the
Bosphorus presumption. The Court stated that it would have to determine in
reality if the defendant States, when joining NATO, were able to consider in
good faith that the internal mechanism for the solution of labour conflicts
47 Beer and Regan, supra n. 45 at para. 54; and ibid. at para. 73.
48 This distinction was expressly confirmed in Lopez Cifuentes v Spain, Application No.18754/06,
Admissibility Decision of 7 July 2009, at para. 31.
49 On this question cf. ECJ, Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665; Emesa Sugar v The
Netherlands, Application No.62023/00, Admissibility Decision of 13 January 2005; and
Vermeulen v Belgium 1996-I; 32 EHRR 313.
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was not in flagrant contradiction to the Convention.50 This suggests that it
would no longer be necessary that the human rights protection existing
within an international organisation is actually equivalent to that under the
Convention at the time of the alleged violation, but rather that the test is
whether at the moment of joining an organisation, Convention Parties acted
in good faith. The crucial time for the Court’s assessment thus seemed to be
the moment of accession to NATO. However, this is in contradiction to
Bosphorus, where the Court held:
State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as
long as the relevant organization is considered to protect fundamental
rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mech-
anisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be con-
sidered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides.51
This implies that the crucial time for the Court’s assessment of whether the
presumption applies or not must be the time of the alleged violation and not
the time of accession to the organisation. Whether a Member State had con-
sidered that the protection offered would not be in violation of the Convention
should thus not determine the applicability of the presumption.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Court’s reason for distinguishing
Connolly is not convincing.Whereas in the Boivin case the applicant had been
removed from his post by an organ of Eurocontrol acting independently of
Member States, in Connolly the reason for the ECJ’s decision not to allow the
applicant to respond to the opinion of the Advocate General was based on the
Statute of the ECJ and its Rules of Procedure (neither of them provide for such
a possibility). Therefore, the Connolly case concerned a structural deficit
rather than an independent decision by an organ of an international organisa-
tion. It therefore resembles Gasparini rather than Boivin. Moreover, in drawing
this distinction, the ECtHR failed to consider Biret. In that case the Court held
that the lack of access to a court or tribunal before which directives could dir-
ectly be challenged was due to an alleged deficit in the Community judicial
order and thus could not be attributed to the respondent States.52 The Court
did not consider that the respondent States agreed to that deficit when con-
cluding the EC Treaty, so that this alleged violation is clearly attributable to
the Member States under Matthews.
What is remarkable about Gasparini, is that it was the first judgment in
which the Court generally held Convention Parties responsible for an act by
50 ‘Pour la Cour, il lui faut en re¤ alite¤ de¤ terminer si, au moment ou' ils ont adhe¤ re¤ a' l’OTAN et lui
ont transfe¤ re¤ certains pouvoirs souverains, les Etats de¤ fendeurs ont pu, de bonne foi, estimer
que le me¤ canisme de re' glement des conflits du travail interne a' l’OTAN n’e¤ tait pas en contra-
diction flagrante avec les dispositions de la Convention.’ See Gasparini, supra n. 36.
51 Bosphorus, supra n. 1 at para. 155 [emphasis added].
52 Biret, supra n. 33 at para. 1.
Beyond Bosphorus 539
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/hrlr/article-abstract/10/3/529/637260 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
an international organisation which has members that are not bound by the
Convention. The USA and Canada are not bound by the Convention, but the
alleged procedural deficit in the Staff Rules of NATO would be attributable to
them also. If the Court had found a violation of the Convention, it would thus
have held these countries indirectly responsible for the violation of a human
rights treaty to which they are not parties. Furthermore, the Court extended
the Bosphorus presumption to an organisation that is not the EU. Bosphorus
was very much regarded as recognition of the EU’s supranational character
and the high level of human rights protection afforded by the ECJ. The exten-
sion of Bosphorus to NATO is therefore surprising.
3. Equivalent Protection and Manifest Deficit
A. The Requirement of a Previous ECJ Decision
One of the questions left open after the Bosphorus judgment was how the
Court would deal with the requirement of a manifest deficiency in the protec-
tion of Convention rights. In that case the Court held that such a deficiency
could not be found because ‘there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of
control of the observance of Convention rights’.53 In so finding, the Court expli-
citly relied on the previous preliminary ruling of the ECJ in the matter. The
case of Coope¤ rative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne v France54 however suggests
that a previous ruling is not always necessary. In that case the applicant farm-
ing cooperatives complained of an infringement of a number of their
Convention rights because the French National Dairy Board requested the pay-
ment of a certain sum of money because the applicants had exceeded their
milk quotas. The legal bases for these milk quotas were three detailed
Community regulations, which provided for a levy to be paid by the producer
where the quotas were exceeded. The French Conseil d’Etat did not make a ref-
erence to the ECJ but decided the case based on these Community regulations.
The ECtHR nonetheless applied the Bosphorus principle and held that there
was no manifest deficiency in the protection of the applicants’ Convention
rights. One could argue that this ruling is astonishing because the
Community judicial system, the existence of which was one of the main rea-
sons why the Court found the protection offered to be equivalent, was not
involved in the actual case. On the other hand, the fact that the Conseil d’Etat
did not make a reference to the ECJ in the present case does not necessarily
mean that fundamental rights were not protected. The domestic courts are
part of the Community legal system in the wider sense. They are bound to
53 Bosphorus, supra n. 1 at para. 166.
54 Application No. 16931/04, Admissibility Decision of 10 October 2006.
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apply Community law and respect its supremacy over domestic law. Thus the
domestic courts are required to examine whether a piece of Community legis-
lation violates fundamental rights and, should the situation arise, make a refer-
ence to the ECJ. Therefore, the Court was correct in not finding a manifest
deficiency in the lack of a reference alone. However, it would have been prefer-
able, for the sake of clarity, if the Court had addressed this question. Instead,
it remained completely silent on this point.
B. The Need to Plead a Manifest Deficit
In Boivin, the Court made it clear that an applicant must establish or at least
allege that the protection of fundamental rights is not equivalent to that of
the Convention system. As the applicant had failed to do so, it did not examine
whether the protection was manifestly deficient in that case. These remarks
must, of course, be considered to have been made obiter dicta as the Court
then ruled that the action was not attributable to the respondent States. In
Gasparini the Court repeated this statement and it can therefore be concluded
that the Court requires that an applicant at least claims either that the protec-
tion offered by the organisation is not equivalent or that it is manifestly defi-
cient. This means that the Court will not examine this question proprio motu.
Rather, the burden of proof for the existence of a manifest deficit is on the
applicant.
C. The Scrutiny Carried Out by the ECtHR
A further issue is the level of scrutiny carried out by the ECtHR. In Bosphorus,
the Court was very quick to conclude that the protection offered by the EC in
that case was not dysfunctional and thus not manifestly deficient.55 The
Court merely pointed to the nature of the interference, the general interest
pursued and the ruling of the ECJ. This created the impression that the
Court’s test would be rather superficial, especially in light of the cursory pro-
portionality test carried out by the ECJ in its own Bosphorus ruling.56 It was
thus suggested that the more impressive human rights analysis in the
Advocate General’s opinion might have saved the ECJ’s decision from greater
Strasbourg scrutiny.57 The first time the Court applied the Bosphorus test was
in the case of Coope¤ rative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne. In that case, the Court
relied on the Grand Chamber’s finding in Bosphorus that the presumption of
protection of Convention rights applied to the EC.With regard to the rebuttal
55 Bosphorus, supra n. 1 at para. 166.
56 ECJ, Case C-84/95 Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy
and Communications and Others [1996] ECR I-3953, at paras 25^6.
57 Peers, supra n. 13 at 454.
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of the presumption, the Court entered into a discussion of whether the aim
pursued by the levy was legitimate and proportionate. For that purpose the
Court referred to its decision in Procola v Luxembourg,58 which dealt with a
very similar levy. This approach suggests that the Court properly examined
whether the levy was justified or not.
In Biret, the Court also relied on the Grand Chamber’s finding that the pro-
tection offered by the Community is equivalent. In contrast to the case just
mentioned, the Court only stated that in the present case there was no mani-
fest deficiency in the protection of fundamental rights and quoted the case of
Coope¤ rative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne mutatis mutandis.59 The Court’s ap-
proach appears to be rather superficial. No test was carried out. The reference
to the case of Coope¤ rative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne mutatis mutandis cannot
act as a substitute for such a test as the only similarity between the two cases
was that the claim was based on the applicant’s property rights. The facts
were not at all comparable. The cooperatives had to pay a levy for exceeding a
milk quota whereas Biret went insolvent because it could no longer carry out
its importing business because of an EC embargo against US beef. As the em-
bargo had already been held to violate WTO law, there would have been ample
reason for the ECtHR to engage with the question of whether an embargo in
violation of WTO law can be a legitimate aim to restrict someone’s property
rights.
In contrast to Biret, the scrutiny carried out in Kokkelvisserij was much
more in-depth. The applicant had argued that the protection afforded by the
EU was manifestly deficient in the light of the Court’s judgment in
Vermeulen.60 The Court had found that the lack of a right to respond to the sub-
missions made by the Belgian avocat ge¤ ne¤ ral infringed the applicant’s right to
an adversarial trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The Court then distinguished
the situation before the ECJ in cases of a preliminary ruling, where there is a
nexus between the domestic procedure and that before the ECJ, from the case
in Vermeulen. In addition the Court pointed to the possibility of re-opening
oral proceedings according to Article 61 of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure. The
Court thus entered into an elaborate discussion as to why there was no mani-
festly deficient protection in the present case.
In a similar vein, in Gasparini the Court discussed in quite some detail why
it was justified that the procedure before the NAB was not public.What was re-
markable about Gasparini, however, was that the Court did not appear to fully
apply the two stages of the Bosphorus test. Rather the Court jumped to the
second stage of the test and examined whether in the present case the mech-
anism for conflict resolution was manifestly deficient. At no point in the
58 A326 (1995); 22 EHRR 193.
59 Supra n. 33 at para. 2.
60 Supra n. 49.
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judgment did the Court state that NATO generally offers a protection equiva-
lent to that offered by the Convention. This is striking as the test of whether
there was a manifestly deficient protection is designed to be a difficult one to
meet. As the Court made it clear in Bosphorus, it requires a dysfunction of the
mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention rights. Such a high
threshold is only justified where the organisation normally offers an equiva-
lent protection, so that the ECtHR can relax the intensity of its oversight.
Only then can the ECtHR tolerate deficiencies in the human rights protection,
which are not manifest.When establishing that the EU offered such an equiva-
lent protection in Bosphorus, the ECtHR argued at length that this was the
case.61 No such argument was made in Gasparini.
All in all, this short review of the ECtHR’s case law reveals a mixed picture.
It seems that the Court is generally willing to discuss the existence of a mani-
fest deficiency in some detail. In Kokkelvisserij, Cooperative des Agriculteurs de
Mayenne and Gasparini the Court entered into a short but convincing scrutiny
of the merits of the case. Regrettably, in Biret no such test was carried out.
There is no apparent reason for this.
4. Discretion
In Bosphorus, the Court made it clear that the presumption can only apply,
where the Member State had no discretion in implementing European Union
law:
It remains the case that a State would be fully responsible under the
Convention for all acts falling outside its strict legal obligations.62
The immediate question was, of course, in what case a Member State must be
deemed to have had discretion. Is this a purely formal question, so that each
time there is an EU Directive a Member State’s discretion must be assumed,
since according to Article 288(3) TFEU (former Article 249 EC Treaty) direct-
ives are (only) binding as to the result to be achieved but leave the Member
States the choice of form and methods? Or do we have to consider the exact
content of each obligation arising from European Union law? Shortly after
Bosphorus, the then President of the ECHR, Luzius Wildhaber, made it clear
that the presumption only applied where the Contracting Party ‘does no more
than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisa-
tion’.63 This statement confirms that the presumption was designed to apply
to acts or omissions which only originated in EU law and where the Member
61 Bosphorus, supra n. 1 at paras 159^65.
62 Ibid. at para. 157.
63 Wildhaber, ‘The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe’, Geneva 8
September 2005 (quoted by Costello, supra n. 9 at 100).
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States merely acted as agents for the EU. In Coope¤ rative des agriculteurs de
Mayenne, the Court expressly repeated the requirement that there be no discre-
tion for the Member State for the presumption to apply. It highlighted that the
Regulation which laid down the amount of the levy left no discretion to the
Member State. Rather than merely pointing to the fact that the legal basis for
the Member State’s action was a Regulation, which the Member States do not
have to transpose into national law but rather have to apply, the Court (albeit
very briefly) looked at the substance of the Regulation and determined that
the Member State had no choice. Given that the Court carried out a substantive
test even though the act of EU law in that case was a Regulation, it seems as
if the Court followed the rationale suggested by Wildhaber. This can be con-
trasted with Biret, where the Court did not mention the requirement that a
Member State must not have any discretion. Rather, it applied the Bosphorus
presumption without any comment to that effect, even though the legal basis
for the embargo was contained in Council Directives. This decision can thus
be understood in two different ways. Either the Court overlooked the require-
ment of a lack of discretion, or the Court was satisfied that the respondent
State did not have any discretion and therefore left the requirement unmen-
tioned.When looking at the exact legal basis for the embargo it becomes quite
clear that the respondent State did not have any discretion when implementing
it. Article 6 of the Directive states that ‘Member States shall prohibit import-
ation from third countries’. Thus the Court was correct in applying the pre-
sumption in this case. For the sake of clarity, however, the Court should have
expressly referred to that requirement. The case law on this point is therefore
not entirely clear. It is suggested, however, against the background of
Wildhaber’s statement and the Court’s decision in Coope¤ rative des Agriculteurs
de Mayenne, that a substantive test must be carried out.
5. Conclusion
The Bosphorus and Matthews case law contradicted the traditional view in
public international law that members of international organisations cannot
be held responsible for acts or omissions by these organisations because they
enjoy a legal personality distinct from that of their Member States.64
Therefore, the extension of the Behrami approach to cases where there was no
domestic act or omission by a Contracting Party can be interpreted as a
return to the more traditional view regarding the responsibility of
Contracting Parties for acts and omissions committed by international
64 On this question cf. the very instructive article by Wilde, ‘Enhancing Accountability at the
International Level: The Tension Between International Organization and Member State
Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake’, (2006) 12 ILSA Journal of International &
Comparative Law 1 at 7^10.
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organisations of which they are members. This distinction now seems to be
well established. As a consequence of that case law, action taken by the EU
under the Common Foreign and Security Policy will not be subjected to
review by the ECtHR, as it will not involve acts or omissions by EU Member
States but rather by the EU itself. This is especially relevant for future missions
carried out in the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defence
Policy.Violations of the ECHR by forces under the command of the EU will not
be attributable to the Member States and any complaints directed against
them will be held inadmissible by the ECtHR. The summary of the case law
provided above has also revealed that there is still some inconsistency in the
Court’s case law involving the responsibility of member states for acts and
omissions of international organisations. The cases of Gasparini and Biret
could have been decided differently in light of the Matthews case. Moreover,
the Court in Gasparini did not establish that the first stage of the Bosphorus
test, the existence of an equivalent protection, was satisfied. Furthermore, in
neither Boivin nor Connolly did the Court explain why it extended its Behrami
reasoning to cases not concerning the UN.
Despite these shortcomings, the conditions for the applicability of the
Bosphorus presumption have been clarified to some extent. An applicant must
claim that there is either no equivalent protection of Convention rights at EU
level, or that the protection in the instant case was manifestly deficient. In
this context, it is remarkable that a manifest deficiency has not yet been
found to exist.
Despite the clarifications found in the case law discussed, some points
remain to be resolved. One question raised in particular by Gasparini is
whether, apart from the EU and NATO, Member States of other international
organisations will benefit from the presumption. A further point which will
have to be addressed is whether the ECtHR will uphold the Bosphorus pre-
sumption after the EU has acceded to the ECHR and thus become a Party to
it, just like its Member States.65
65 EU membership of the ECHR has become possible with the entry into force of Protocol No. 14
on 1 June 2010. On the future of the Bosphorus presumption, see Lock, ‘The ECJ and the
ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts’, (2009) 8 The Law and
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 375 at 395^6.
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